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CHAPTER 7 
Insurance Law 
JOHN G. RYAN• 
§7.1. Unfair or deceptive acts or practices: Exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. In the 1972 Survey year the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court held, in Gordon v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Co.,l that 
the remedies under the provisions of the Massachusetts Consumer Protec-
tion Act2 are not independent of the action of state administrative 
agencies. Essentially the effect of the decision was that a plaintiff seeking 
money damages because the defendant insurer had discontinued a rate 
deviation without notice, in violation of the Consumer Protection Act, 
was required to seek relief through the Commissioner of Insurance before 
resorting to the chapter 93A remedy. The decision has been criticized 
on a number of grounds.a 
In the 1973 Survey year, the Legislature took action to eliminate the 
defense used in Gordon of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
According to chapter 939 of the Acts of 1973, this defense is no longer 
available and the court must now decide a chapter 93A petition unless 
presented with evidence that a finding for the plaintiff would "disrupt 
or be inconsistent with" a regulatory scheme or that the agency has "a 
substantial interest" in review prior to judicial action and "power to 
provide substantially the relief sought by the petitioner" and his class. 
It would seem that had such a provision existed at the time of the 
Gordon case, the decision-though perhaps not the final result-would 
have been different. The provision aids plaintiffs in litigation by placing 
the burden on the defendant to articulate a rationale for review by an 
administrator, such as the Commissioner of Insurance, prior to judicial 
decision of the case. This in turn requires that any administrative relief 
granted in such cases be meaningful to a plaintiff rather than merely 
"adequate" in a theoretical sense. 
§7.2. Automobile insurance: Coverages. Several major legislative 
actions affecting auto insurance coverages were taken during the 1973 
• JoHN G. RYAN is the Commissioner of Insurance for the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts. 
§7.1. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 757, 281 N.E.2d 57!1. 
2 G.L c. 9!1A. 
a See, e.g., 1972 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §10.6. 
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Survey year. One of them, chapter 953 of the Acts of 1973, is an obvious 
response to public criticism of the fact that, under the provisions of the 
Property Protection Insurance Act of 1971,1 a deductible of at least $100 
applies to every claim for damage to an automobile. This public concern 
had been met in part by administrative action that first made available 
a lower deductible of fifty dollars and then allowed insureds to purchase 
an optional "waiver" of any deductible in certain limited instances in 
which it could be shown clearly that the other party to an accident was 
at fault.ll Despite these actions, there continued to be considerable criti-
cism of the application of the deductible and this motivated legislative 
action. 
In the new Act two new optional coverages are set up with a require-
ment that insurers make them available to their customers upon request. 
The first of the new options would waive the effect of any deductible in 
any at-fault situation. It is significantly broader than the previously 
offered "waiver" in that it will eliminate the deductible in all cases where 
it can be shown that the insured's damage is the result of the legal fault 
of another.8 Comparative negligence will, of course, still apply to limit 
or deny coverage. The second of the new options takes a further step by 
eliminating the deductible and any reduction in payment from compara-
tive negligence doctrines so long as the claimant is no more than fifty 
percent at fault.' Without such coverage a driver buying the so-called 
"Option 2"11 that has been available receives nothing when fifty 
percent or more at fault and has his loss cut by the degree of fault less 
than fifty percent attributed to him.e If such a person elects the new 
coverage. he will be paid in full for his damage in any case where he is 
not more than 50% at fault. Since comparative negligence is not applied 
to persons buying "Option 1" coverage,T as tb them this new option is 
of no benefit. 
Chapter 599 of the Acts of 1973 is more noteworthy for what it 
eliminates than for what it adds to automobile insurance coverage. Its 
§7 .2. 1 G.L c. 90, §!140. 
ll Regulations to this effect are on file in the Office of the Commissioner of lnsur· 
ance. The waiver of the deductible would occur only if the damaged vehicle were 
(I) legally parked, or (2) struck in the rear, or (!I) struck by a vehicle driven by a 
person who either was subsequently convicted of operating under the influence of 
drugs or narcotics or was driving the wrong way on a one-way street. 
a Acts of 197!J, c. 95!J, §l(a). The new option is significantly broader than that men-
tioned in note 5 supra in that under the new option any showing of legal fault in 
another vehicle operator, and not just certain limited types of fault, will operate to 
waive the deductible. 
4 G.L c. 95!J, §l(b). 
II See Acts of 1971, c. 978, §1(2). 
8 An exception to these absolute provisions was made for vehicles damaged under 
any of the circumstances mentioned in note 5 supra. See G.L c. 90, §§!J40(2)(c), (d) 
and (e). 
T See Acts of 1971, c. 978, §1(1). 
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first section strikes out the second paragraph of section 113B of G.L. c. 
175, a provision first added in 1972,8 which provided for a separate rating 
classification for persons entitled to recover wage-loss after automobile 
accidents from a wage continuation plan." The classification was designed, 
presumably, to bring about lower premium charges for those having sucli 
other sources. of recovery. But neither the title of the Act10 nor any 
other data gives any explanation for this legislative reversal. Nor does 
consideration of the rest of the Act suggest any reason for the change; 
Section 2 merely broadens the insurer's duty to pay no-fault wage loss 
benefits11 by requiring "reimbursement" by the automobile insurer to 
wage continuation programs "which provide for accumulated benefits 
which can be converted into either cash or additional retirement credit." 
Some wage continuation programs do allow unused "sick leave" to be 
converted into either cash or extra retirement time. Chapter. 599 would 
prevent the bar of payment on a no-fault basis to persons with wage 
continuation plans12 from depriving the injured of this added benefit of 
employment. 
Two legislative efforts to solve, or at least ameliorate, the problem of 
low liability limits for bodily injury were made during the 1973 Survey 
year. One seeking to increase the minimum amount of coverage required 
under the compulsory lawlB from $5,000 per person/$10,000 per accident, 
to $10,000 ~ personf$20,000 per accident, resulted in a veto by Governor 
Francis W. Sargent.~<~ The veto message was never acted upon by the 
Legislature. · · ·· · · 
The other, which may have significant impact in certain cases, was 
enactment of chapter 380 of the Acts of 1973 which makes ''under-insured 
motorist coverage" available for the first time in Massachusetts. Chapter 
380 establishes the new coverage as an optional coverage "for the protec-
tion of persons insured themselves who are legally entitled to recover 
damages from owners or operators of insured motor vehicles •.. whose 
policies or bonds are insufficient in limits of liability to satisfy said 
damages .... "The coverage will obligate a policyholder's own insurer 
to satisfy any judgment he receives against a third party tortfeasor that 
cannot be met by the tortfeasor's automobile liability policy. An insurer 
8 Acts of 1972, c. 451. 
II It seems, though, that the duty of the Colllllllaaioner of Insurance to establfsh 
fair and reasonable .. classifications of rilb (G.L c. 175, fll5B, first paragraph) is 
such that even after enactment of chapter 599 separate rates for such persona may 
still be made. 
10 "Personal Injury Protection Insurance Fund-Wage Continuation Programs-
Reimbursements." 
11 For a general discussion of the statutory provisions relating to no-fault wage 
loss benefits, see 17 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 530 (1970). 
12 See G.L c. 90, §MA. 
18 Id. 
1f 1973 Mass. Legis. Doc. H. No. 7040 (Sept. 12, 1975). 
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issuing such coverage will obviously have an interest in the proceedings 
against the third party which are adverse to the interest of its own policy-
holder. Additionally, the insurer issuing the coverage will expect to be 
subrogated to its policyholder's rights against the tortfeasor. Thus it 
seems likely that provisions respecting notice and co-operation of the 
insured will be added to the coverage defined in chapter 880 before a 
policy containing such coverage is offered for sale. 
Comprehensive coverage has been altered by enactment of section 1, 
chapter 680 of the Acts of 1978 which sets forth a new definition of the 
customary contract term requiring payment up to "the actual cash value" 
of a damaged vehicle. The mandate of the statute is easy to understand 
but difficult to apply. In brief it precludes reducing the value of the 
vehicle "to less than the average retail value of that particular vehicle's 
year and model unless the policy was purchased at a reduced rate due to 
the mileage and condition of the insured vehicle." Claims adjustors 
have customarily reduced their offers for damaged vehicles because of 
excess mileage or poor condition which, in their opinion, made a particu-
lar vehicle less valuable than an average one of the same type. For losses 
covered by comprehensive coverage, this practice will no longer be per-
mitted unless the premium charge offered reflects the adverse conditions. 
While the idea of the Act is unobjectionable, it remains to be seen 
whether or not it is practical to refine the rating process further in order 
to give recognition to all the conditions that may in practice lead to 
varying· values. If, as is likely, it is not feasible to develop such rating 
schemes, the likely effects of the Act will be to overpay a minority of 
claimants at the ultimate expense of the majority of the insureds. 
§7.3. Automobile insurance: Assigned risks. Possibly the most far-
reaching legislative change of 1973 dealing with automobile insurance 
is represented by chapter 551 of that year's Acts which makes a funda-
mental change in the method of handling "assigned risks." 
One generally ignored but nonetheless critical distinction between 
automobile insurance in Massachusetts and that found in most other 
states is that Massachusetts law makes significant coverages easily avail-
able to every registered vehicle owner at regular rates.1 It can be easily 
demonstrated that one result of this peculiarity is that the majority of 
accident-free, "average" drivers in Massachusetts pay considerably more 
for their automobile insurance than they would were a system of sur-
charged rates for accident-involved drivers in effect. The demonstrated 
inadequacy of rates for the 200,000 to 300,000 "assigned" or "ex-assigned"2 
§7.8. 1 This situation may be changing ·as additional states adopt "no fault" 
insurance laws which are, for the most part, compulsory. 
There is no legal bar to differing rates for assigned risks. Efforts of insurers to 
obtain different rates have failed because of an inability or unwillingness on the 
part of the insurance industry to describe objective standards that underlie decisions 
to reject risks. G.L. c. 175, §llllC makes all usual coverages available to all risks. 
lll Technically, under prior Massachusetts practice a driver was an assigned risk 
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risks has also restricted rate competition in Massachusetts. Massachusetts 
has also been unique in that it guarantees continued coverage to all its 
motorists through strict regulation of cancellation and renewal practices. 
Chapter 551 of the Acts of 1973 expands the protection given to 
motorists against cancellation, refusal of coverage and non-renewal and 
makes the mechanics of handling "assigned" and "ex-assigned" risks quite 
different from what they have been in the past. The first three sections of 
the Act clarify what once was a prior jumble of provisions relating to 
cancellation and non-renewal of coverage.a Essentially the effect of the 
three sections is to prevent either cancellation or non-renewal (that is, 
the refusal to issue successive policies) except for any one of the following 
reasons: 
I) Non-payment of premiums;4 
2) Fraud or material misrepresentation in the application for re-
newal; 
3) Suspension or revocation of license or registration of the named 
insured or resident of the insured's household who customarily 
operates the vehicle; or 
4) Failure to furnish a company with a renewal application at least 
30 days prior to expiration of the previous policy. 
The crucial change in the law in this area is the elimination of provisions 
from prior lawll that permitted cancellation, without restriction, during 
the first 90 days of coverage. 
Section 4 of the Act adds to the cancellation and renewal provisions 
a new affirmative duty on the part of the insurer to issue a policy to any 
applicant who is not then indebted to another company for auto cover-
ages provided during the "preceding 12 months." An exception to this 
requirement is made for any person who usually drives the motor 
vehicle to be insured but does not have, or is ineligible to obtain, a 
driver's license. 
Sections 5 and 6 of the Act build upon the new restrictions on company 
selection of risks, by adding a new method to apportion among all 
carriers the losses of risks who would, under the prior system, be con-
sidered "assigned" risks. They mandate the creation of a plan which 
provides for "the fair and equitable distribution of expenses and losses 
only for the first year he was assigned to a company. The great bulk of persons the 
insurance companies consider as undesirable risks remain with the insurer to whom 
they were originally assigned and are termed "ex-assigned" risks. 
a Apparently by oversight, Acta of 19711, c. 551, §I eliminates new provisions on 
refunding of premiums after cancellation that were added in the 197!1 session Acta 
of 19711, c. 408. 
4 Reinstatement is required after a cancellation for non-payment if payment is made 
pursuant to the provisions of Acta of 19711, c. 405. 
II G.L c. 175, §22C, as amended by Acta of 1970, c. !187. 
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by reinsurance." Recognizing market realities, the Legislature now re-
quires that the plan must provide for "immediate certification" of an 
application and payment of a "fair and reasonable commission" to any 
licensed agent or broker designated by the applicant. The practical result 
of all this is disclosed in a "Plan of Operation" filed by the Governing 
Committee of the Reinsurance Facility set up by the statute, with the 
Commissioner of Insurance, and later approved by him, which sets up a 
"Reinsurance Facility" in place of the former assigned risk plan. In brief 
the plan allows any company, agent or broker to accept any applicant 
upon application and then to "re-insure" the risk by making it a risk 
which all companies providing automobile insurance in Massachusetts 
will share. To eliminate "dumping" each insurer can put no more than 
twenty percent of those to whom he provides insurance in the "reinsured" 
category. The twenty percent limit does not, however, apply to risks 
accepted from agents and brokers who did not have an agency relation-
ship with a company providing auto insurance in Massachusetts in 1973 
and who were "assigned" to a specific carrier for servicing business. The 
reason for this exemption is, apparently, to encourage insurers to set up 
business relationships with those agents and brokers who have, in the 
past, specialized in assisting assigned risks. 
If the overall plan envisaged by chapter 551 operates as expected, an 
applicant will receive automobile insurance from any company, agent 
or broker he chooses to deal with. While the agent, broker or under-
writer will then decide whether to keep the risk or to "re-insure" it, that 
decision will not affect the applicant in any way. 
§7.4. Fire insurance. A legislative concern over cancellation and 
non-renewal of coverages which was displayed in the automobile insur-
ance area by enactment of Chapter 551 of the Acts of 1973, was carried 
over into the fire insurance area in the 1973 Survey year. Chapter 378 
of the Acts of 1973 precludes cancellation of policies containing the 
standard fire insurance policy provisions1 once the policy has been 
effective for sixty days except for six specified reasons. The second sec-
tion of the Act requires a forty-five day notice of intention not to renew 
together with an explanation of the reasons for non-renewal as a condi-
tion precedent to a refusal to renew a policy protecting "a dwelling or 
contents thereor' for loss by reason of fire. No specified reasons are re-
quired for non-renewal, but a copy of the notice to the insured must be 
furnished to the Commissioner of Insurance. 
The non-cancellation provisions preclude cancellation except for: 
1) Non-payment of premium; 
2) Conviction of a crime arising out of acts increasing the hazard 
insured against; 
§7.4. 1 G.L c. 175, §99. 
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8) Discovery of fraud or material misrepresentation by the insured 
in obtaining the policy; 
4) Discovery of willful or reckless acts or omissions by the insured 
increasing the hazard insured against; 
5) Physical changes in the property insured which result in the. 
property becoming uninsurable; or 
6) A determination by the Commissioner that continuation of the 
policy would violate or place the insurer in violation of the law. 
§7.5. Life insurance. A new attempt has been made in the 1973 
Survey year to modify the effect of John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance 
Co. v. Commissioner of lnsurance,1 a 1965 case which struck down as 
beyond the power of the State a state statute2 designed to prevent the 
termination or lapse of policies for non-payment of premiums during a 
strike of insurance· agents. The Court found that the statute upset the 
bilateral freedom of collective bargaining intended by Congress under 
the National Labor Relations Act. It was thus held to be an invalid 
exercise of the State's police power.s 
The draftsmen of Chapter 454 of the Acts of 1978 seek to avoid the 
decision in the John Hancock case by providing that after lapse of an 
insurance policy for non-payment of the premium during a strike rein-
statement will be allowed upon payment of the premium within 81 days 
of the termination of the strike, without new evidence of insurability. 
Unlike the statute struck down in John Hancock, Chapter 454 does not 
encompass all life, non-cancellable disability and hospital expense policies, 
but applies only to life insurance policies "having non-forfeiture values, 
which are ineligible for an automatic premium loan." Presumably any 
test of this statute will raise the argument that there is a significant state 
concern in protecting persons who do not have premium loan provisions 
in their policies. Such policies would be primarily "industrial policies" 
which represent a significant part of the "debit" agent business. A show-
ing that such persons are dependent upon the collection practices to 
which they have become accustomed might tip the scales in favor of 
state power over the policy underlying the National Labor Relations Act. 
§7.6. Accident and sickness insurance. The 1978 Survey year pro-
duced two precedent-making administrative decisions that prodded the 
Legislature into considering new authority over the contents of health 
insurance policies and the sale practices of health insurers. In a May 10, 
1978 decision, a Deputy Commissioner of Insurance, acting pursuant to 
the provisions of G.L. c. 175, §§ 108, S(B), withdrew approval of 154 
accident, sickness and disability policies sold by ten different insurance 
companies. The decision was based on findings that certain provisions 
§7.5 1 M9 Mass. !190, 208 N.E.2d 516 (1965). 
2 Acts of 196!1, c. 796. 
a M9 Mass. at 402-04, 208 N.E.2d at 524-25. 
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of the policies concerning elimination periods,t renewal guarantees, 
premium adjustment, pre-existing conditions, the amount of benefits and 
co-ordination of benefits with Medicare "encouraged misrepresentation" 
of the policies by insurers to the public. Several appeals from the Deputy 
Commissioner's decision were taken to the Commissioner of Insurance.2 
In disposing of them, the Commissioner made certain modifications but 
upheld the disapproval of all but one policy. The Commissioner, how-
ever, stayed the effective dates of the disapprovals until July 1, 1974, and 
announced his intention to seek legislative change to meet the policy 
provisions problem "in a direct and even-handed manner."8 
In a related decision the same Deputy Commissioner, on August 28, 
1973, promulgated "Rules Governing the Marketing of Health Insur-
ance"' pursuant to the authority of G.L c. 176D, §11. Objections5 of 
companies to these rules raised the issue of whether or not they went 
beyond the limited authority granted by the statute. The Commissioner 
of Insurance at legislative hearings on the matter again announced his 
concern over the legal issue. 
Chapter 1081 of the Acts of 1973 represents the statutory change the 
Commissioner sought in order to clarify his powers in these respects. It 
attacks the policy provisions problem by giving the Commissioner author-
ity to adopt regulations "to establish minimum standards of full and 
fair disclosure for the form and content" of accident and sickness insur-
ance 
to bring about: 
a) reasonable standardization and simplification of coverages to 
facilitate understanding and comparisons; 
b) elimination of provisions which may be misleading or unreason-
ably confusing, in connection either with the purchase of such 
insurance or with the settlement of claims; 
c) elimination of deceptive practices in connection with the sale· of 
such insurance; 
d) elimination of provisions which may be contrary to the health 
care needs of the public; 
e) elimination of coverages which are so limited in scope as to be 
of no substantial economic value to the holders thereof. 
Once such rules are promulgated, the Commissioner is given further 
authority to withdraw by written notice past approvals of policies that 
§7.6. 1 "Elimination periods" are waiting periods during which benefits which 
have accrued are not paid out. 
2 Appeals from decisions of subordinates of the Commissioner to the Commissioner 
may be made in accordance with the provisions of G.L. c. ?6, §7. 
a The text of the Commissioner's announcement is on file in the office of the 
Commissioner of Insurance. 
' These rules are on file in the Office of the Commissioner of Insurance. 
5 Appeals from these rules, may be made pursuant to G.L. c. 26, §7. 
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do not meet the standards. The Act also gives the Commissioner direct 
authority to adopt regulations concerning advertising of accident and 
sickness policies "to assure that such advertising is truthful and not 
misleading, in fact or in implication." 
Thoughtful use of the new powers given to the Commissioner of 
Insurance can have considerable influence on the accident and sickness 
insurance business. An emergency preamble added to the legislation 
made it effective November 27, 1975, indicating that early use of the 
powers is expected. 
§7.7. Marketing: Mass merchandising of automobile and fire insur-
ance. Chapter 1098 of the Acts of 1975, which took effect on November 
28 of that year after a veto by the Governor was over-ridden in the 
Legislature, authorizes the "group marketing" of automobile and home-
owner insurance.l Adding a new section 195R to G.L. c. 175, it first 
defines "group marketing."2 It then prohibits the provisions of coverage 
through such plans unless certain conditions are met. The conditions 
are for the most part desirable in that they continue the State's policy 
of easy availability of coverage by requiring that all risks be accepted 
and renewed without individual rating or coverage discrimination. 
Restrictions on the type and size of groups, which led to the veto by 
the Governor, require that at least thirty-five percent of the persons in 
a qualified group be "insured within one year of the effective date of 
the plan, such percentage to continue so insured at all times thereafter." 
If this provision is constitutional, there is evidence that it will lead to a 
refusal to renew a number of groups that do not reach that level of 
participation. However, since the provision is likely to engender a con-
stitutional test as to whether or not it is reasonably related to a permissi-
ble legislative objective, it seems safe to predict that it will not long 
remain unchallenged by members of groups who are deprived of the 
benefits of a plan. 
§7.7 1 The Act also contains a re-draft of chapter 555 of the Acts of 1975, dealing 
with acquisition of minority stock in insurance companies. 
2 "Group marketing" is defined as 
any system, design or plan whereby motor vehicle or homeowner insurance is 
afforded to employees of an employer, or to members of a trade union associa-
tion, or organization and to which the employer, trade union, association or 
organization has agreed to or in any way affiliated itself with, assisted, encouraged 
or participated in the sale of such insurance to its employees or members through 
a payroll deduction plan or otherwise. 
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